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1THE DARK GLORY OF CRIMINALS
NOTES ON THE ICONIC IMAGINATION OF THE MULTITUDES1
Sergio Tonkonoff
“At any rate, a great number of problems change their aspects
completely as soon as their connections with the sociology of
religion are recognized”.
Emile Durkheim – Preface to L’Année Sociologique, Vol. I, 1899, 
page v.
When writing about the collective reaction to crime, Emile Durkheim postulated its social 
functionality and emphasized its negative and immoderate character. Punishment, 
Durkheim (1933, p. 85) says, is a passionate collective reaction that seeks to avenge the
highest values of the group and, because of that, it recognizes no limits. Released to its own 
dynamics, it will be blind, and its destructive violence will stop only when the affective 
energy that animates it has been extinguished. Thus, in addition to the cohesive functions 
he attributes to penal punishment, three elements are significant in Durkheim’s treatment of 
the collective response to criminal transgression: its affective nature, the repulsion it 
expresses, and its excessiveness. One may agree with this and yet immediately wonder: is 
this description complete? Does it not forget or misrecognize an aspect of the collective 
affectivity that, on this matter, is both opposite and complementary to repulsion? More 
specifically, is crime not both repulsive and attractive? Is the criminal not obscurely
seductive?
Georges Bataille discussed these themes in relation to Gilles de Rais, a15th-century 
French nobleman who killed multiple children for his ‘personal pleasure’. Bataille states
that the feelings of horror and fascination this killer instilled in his contemporaries reached 
such a degree that he assumed the figure of a “sacred monster” (Bataille 1965, p.39).After 
de Rais’s public execution, his name remained in the collective memory, assimilated to – or 
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2confused with – the terrible Bluebeard. De Rais became a legend which, retold from one 
generation to another, reverberated with the terror and the fascination that had made it 
come to life.
Let me quote another reference. The Lives of Infamous Men is a text that Michel
Foucault (1994) wrote to prologue a book that was never published. In this text Foucault 
distances himself from the interest in great criminals (de Rais among them) because he 
considered their infamy to be a modality of fame. But, at the same time, Foucault 
acknowledges the intense and ambivalent feelings – laughter and shivering – he
experienced when examining obscure crimes committed by unknown criminals. His
intention was, he states, to provide an account of the lives and crimes of these men and 
women in a paradoxical way: rebuilding them analytically without allowing their intensity 
to escape. Nevertheless, he immediately recognized his failure. He did not possess, he says,
the necessary talent to accomplish this undertaking successfully – and perhaps, we may 
add, nobody really does. For the same reason, Foucault claims that he would be satisfied
with the publication, without gloss, of a collection of documents: lettres de cachet,
incarceration orders, and hospital registers, which would transmit the violent existence of 
these wretched criminals as well as the reactions they raised or to which they were a 
pretext. These documents, Foucault says, have a fictional character. Or, rather, reality and
fiction become mixed in them, creating the legend through which these infamous lives 
reach us, producing ‘an odd effect, a mixture of beauty and fright’ (Foucault1994, p. 239).
I would like to propose, however, that if the criminal is experienced as repulsive and
attractive at once, this is true not only for French intellectuals with a visible sympathy 
towards marginality or la bohème (Bataille and Foucault, in this case). Even when
repulsion is at first sight the only possible reaction for the ‘average person’, the opposite
feeling never seems to be totally absent. Even though individuals respectful of the law deny 
this fascination, and think that their relation to violence – and violent people – is one of 
open rejection, we need only observe their cultural consumption to refute this claim. In
mass media imagery, for instance, violence linked to murder and sexuality is a core
element. By following a cathartic and edifying model, these narratives usually allow the
fleeting identification of the spectator with the criminal to reaffirm finally the spectator’s
commitment to prohibitions. The importance of this consumption indicates the prestige that
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can also recall the periodic and fervent adherence of ordinary people to the bloodiest wars,
whether nationalist or civil.
Hence if the primary phenomenon is – as Durkheim pointed out – the reaction of 
great affective intensity that crime unleashes, this affectivity does not seem purely and 
simply repulsive. Instead, it is characterized by its ambivalence, as well as its mutability. 
That, at least, is one of the theses of this paper; theses which I would like to introduce as 
follows: 1) Criminal events unsettle individuals habitually subject to instrumental actions, 
identitarian thinking and positive law; 2) this unsettledness is affective as well as cognitive;
3)under certain conditions of communication, it can lead them to states of multitude; 4) this
explains the excessiveness of collective responses to crime, as well as their ambivalence 
and the mutability; 5) this reaction authorizes us to qualify criminals – especially great 
criminals – as heterogeneous or ‘sacred characters’, and to affirm that 6) they are symbolic 
devices suitable to accomplish mythological functions related to the vicarious 
transgressions of common people.
Heterogeneous
Let us consider one of our criminals, preferably someone who escapes the presumption of a
utilitarian motivation for his/her crime: the young student that stabbed his girlfriend a 
hundred and thirteen times, or the polite old woman that poisoned her guests tea; or any 
person without an apparent mental illness and proven to be capable of a violence literally 
unthinkable. These criminals induce a strange reaction from average citizens. There they 
are; they are apparently like anyone else. But only apparently; that is why they are feared. 
Something troubling is conjectured to be inside them, something that, in some way, is not 
themselves. An irregular force possesses them and makes them unpredictable and 
dangerous. They live outside the law; they do not obey the prohibitions that everyone else 
obeys. Above all, they may kill, because they already have done so; and they may do it at 
will, because they are humans. However, it is not sufficient to say that they lack scruples, 
because, in this case, they lack the very scruples which define humanness. It is not possible 
to decide. The violence of a wild beast is attributed to them, yet at the same time they must 
be punished as guilty persons. In any case, their type is not the common type. They embody 
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animals, the evil of sinners, the courage of heroes and, sometimes, the brilliance of the 
genius. That is why they are treated as radically separate beings or even, it could be said, as 
taboo.
What happens is that mythical thought is far from constituting a folkloric rarity, an
exclusive property of so-called primitive peoples, or a pathological phenomenon in 
contemporary societies. The criminal question is exemplary in this respect. From court
sentences to mass-media broadcasts, from artistic expressions to informal conversations
about the issue, it would be easy to find discursive testimonies of this ‘archaic’ mode of 
comprehending (and constructing) reality – as if criminal violence, and the reactions to 
which it gives rise, refuted the thesis of the final disenchantment of culture.
A central characteristic of this type of thinking is the refusal to establish a clear 
distinction between subject and object. Those who experience reality according to its terms 
are not guided, at that moment, by the logic of identity and the excluded third, but by the 
principle of participation as considered by Lévy Bruhl (1960) and later summarized by 
Bataille: think ‘that a thing simultaneously is and is not, or that it can be what it is and 
something else at the same time’ (Bataille 1986, p. 45). This principle involves the belief in 
forces imperceptible to the senses which are nevertheless at work. Participation sets itself as 
a connection between one reality likely to be empirically validated and another that can 
only be felt, or between two felt realities. In any case, participation is an experience in 
which the affective elements prevail over the cognitive ones. This does not necessarily 
mean that the objects experienced lack representation, but that the link between those 
representations – the nexus through which they communicate – is more affective than 
conceptual. 
This is visible, for example, in the way that criminals are commonly portrayed: at 
once human and inhumane, or human and animal, or as free-will sinners and automatons of 
evil (or illness). It is also observable in the habitual linking of the series ‘infraction-
pathology-dangerousness-crime’: the one who consumes illegal drugs is seen as an addict 
(which, of course, is not necessarily so), and being an addict makes him/her dangerous (an 
attribution impossible to demonstrate a priori), because his/her compulsive dependency – it 
will be said – may drive him/her to other kinds of transgression, such as robbery or even 
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once a man indulges himself in murder, very soon he comes to think little of robbing; and 
from robbing he comes next to drinking and Sabbath-breaking, and from that to incivility 
and procrastination. Once begun upon this downward path, you never know where to stop’.
(De Quincey 1889, p. 56).
If crime puts this peculiar reasoning at stake, it is because it appears as a 
heterogeneous event, ‘completely Other’ with respect to the societal (or homogeneous) 
ensemble1.Homogeneous is a social space characterized by the commutability and 
commensurability of the elements (actions, relations and agents) that compose it, and the 
prevalence of identitarian thinking and institutionally regulated interaction. This societal
structuration needs to exclude certain actions (or omissions) as criminal in order to 
configure itself, but it also needs to regulate the affective and representational economy of 
its subjects to reproduce this configuration. Then, in transgressing deep and irrational 
prohibitions that have a foundational value to this order, the criminal act produces a 
cognitive and affective commotion, putting individuals out of their regular modes of 
perception and comprehension. At that moment, the habitual cognitive structure 
(apprehensive about contradictions) tends to yield and go off-centre, giving place not to a 
formless vacuum but to the framework of mythical thinking: the crucible of the most 
fabulous images, figures, rumors and legends. It seems as if only the oneiric language of 
myth, in its condensations and displacements, its symbols and stereotypes, could 
correspond to the affective intensity unleashed by criminal violence.
But there is more: myth is capable of promoting a direct, non-institutionalized, 
relationship between collective emotions and beliefs and collective action. In other words,
myths are capable of engendering multitudes, whether diffuse or concentrated. 
Heterogeneous criminal events put at stake precisely those (heterogeneous) modes of 
thinking, feeling and acting associated with this multitudinary sociability. Criminal events
push individuals not only to the Other of their habitual affective and cognitive patterns, but 
also drive them to the others – and do so in a mimetic and fervent way. This fusional 
communication, detaching individuals out of their regular frameworks of action and 
relation, is usually productive of spontaneous social movements. 
Causing disquiet, fear, anger and/or curiosity, crime generates a sort of social bond
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structured roles and functions, but to non-regulated disseminations of intense desires and 
beliefs. In this condition of multitude, whoever thinks of crime and criminals does so 
mythically.2 In the plasticity of its structure, the myth can grasp, and to a certain extent 
organize, these collective emotions, giving sense to the always recurrent and always 
unexpected experience of violence and death. In such effervescent states, feelings and 
thoughts are ambivalent, because for these ‘out-of-joint’ individuals it is not possible to fix 
their judgments and emotions antithetically. Moreover, it can be said that, in such states, the 
extremes come together: a fascinating terror or a terrorizing fascination arise. This is 
especially so when fusional communication converges in a single point; a singular figure
who reflects and incarnates the phantasmic imagination of publics and crowds formed in 
this way.
This entire psycho-social dynamic, essential to understanding collective reactions to 
crime as well as the myth of the criminal and its functions in contemporary societies, is
clearly discernible in moments of social crisis.3
Social Crises as Epistemological Advantage
It can be argued that a stable society is one with a central – and relatively organized – frame 
of reference which organizes everyday social behaviour, providing individuals with general 
elements to read their own social roles, positions and possibilities. It is an ensemble in 
which the central and marginal elements are clearly differentiated. By contrast, a critical 
state is a moment of brutal questioning of a particular society. It is an extreme juncture of 
implosion or explosion, characterized by a sudden change of speed in the time of that 
society and by a de-structuration of its symbolic space. As a critical period arises, the limits 
of social order become porous and elements of habitually differentiated and solid positions 
move and communicate rapidly. Society loses legibility for its inhabitants, as though the 
components were not in the place they were given in the known structure, and words no 
longer matched things. What used to be an established ensemble, a slow-motion 
association, becomes off-centre and vertiginously accelerated. The referential framework 
that allowed everyone to see society as a relatively organized whole and to localize their 
own place in that whole has been dislocated. This produces a general imbalance in the 
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experience it as a growing abyss, a fatally dissolving process (if urgent and definitive 
measures are not taken). Deprived of their structural patterns, persons subject to law, 
property and routine feel their security affected. This tendency towards undifferentiation 
opens into an overt deployment of fear: the future, values and possessions seem to be 
threatened. One more step into that (lived) decomposition and individuals will believe that 
their life is in danger. Now the hallucinated images of chaos flow freely, and are as pressing 
as the desire for total order. 
When that happens, the time for myth is prepared, and unleashed collective energy 
is available to be incarnated in a great individual, to convert him/her into a transcendent 
figure. A violent leader (restorer of absolute order) or the all-stalking enemy 
(personification of chaos) is ready to be born. And it is possible to say that the one born in 
this way is a mytho-historical individual: Caesar or the Messiah, Al Capone or Jack the 
Ripper–there is no difference here between reality and fiction. By appearing simultaneously 
or successively, these polarized doubles outline a system. On the one hand, they are the 
representatives of disintegration and impurity; on the other, the lords of order. And between 
these two poles, forming part of the system inaugurated by them, a phantasmagoric 
multitude can usually be found. Les miserables or the dangerous classes often have their 
own place in this imaginary composition as a latent and diffuse threat, always ready to 
pounce. Not only the great criminal or the bloody ruler, but the multitude too, often has 
been imagined as a wild animal: usually, like the former two, as a wolf.4
The critical situation is, to use Durkheim’s (1995) notion, a period of collective 
effervescence. It is the moment in which common people find themselves shaken by the 
proliferation of intense affective and imaginative reactions. It is the moment when those 
who had belonged to the category of conformist tend to become politicized – or, at least, to 
participate in the whirlwind generated by a collective ‘fable-teller function’ more vigorous 
than usual. It is also the time of action. In crisis moments, notaries advance like Arabs – as 
Deleuze (1987, p. 404) would say – or the middle classes get ready for a revolution to 
regain order – as Monnerot (1969, p. 496) pointed out. It is when respectable neighbours 
massacre unfortunate marauders; when renowned criminals are chosen as police chiefs; or 
when marginal individuals, with neither occupation nor fixed address, become eminent 
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not the viceroy or the bureaucrat: it is Louis Napoleon’s time, as well as Hitler’s or 
Mussolini’s. It is a maddened moment that mingles people and situations which in periods 
of balance would have belonged to different worlds.
As these last examples suggest, along with this massive concentration of collective 
affectivity in one individual, the passage of this individual from the margins to the centre of 
symbolic space, and from institutionalized repulsion to collective attraction, can be 
considered characteristic features of multitudinary processes. The subject of this mutation 
from repulsion to attraction are the great number of established individuals thrown into a 
fusional communication by such crises; individuals that find themselves captives of an 
ambivalent effervescence that reaches its limit-point – and, in a certain sense, its definition 
and closure – in the designation of a Great Individual (that is to say, in the object of this 
passage). That is why Monnerot (1969, p. 437) could write that, in Hitler and Mussolini, a 
historical path that went ‘from the asylum to the capitol’ was drawn.5
The Criminal as Great Individual
In times of relative social and cultural stability, what is socially high and low, interior and 
exterior, attractive and repulsive, tends to be clear and distinct. These references, by 
remaining relatively defined and constant, configure a system that concurrently maintains
social cohesion and reproduces existent hierarchies. The heuristic potential of critical 
periods resides in exposing the collective mechanisms and dynamics that produce those 
stable configurations. These periods unleash the forces and meanings upon which these 
configurations are founded and which usually rest latent and tied to the habitual functioning 
of order.
In the first place, critical periods reveal that the individual is a form produced by 
(and subject to) structural positions of societal order, and subject as well to secondary 
thinking and affective states corresponding to the regular development of that structuration. 
These periods also show that heterogeneous events can push individuals ‘out of 
themselves’; that is to say, can lead them, through intense emotions and an overflow of 
imagination, into states of multitude.
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always separate and ‘transcendent’) is one of the results of those states of multitude. And 
this is so because those individuals are the points where collective passions and phantoms 
become condensed, producing an eccentric and monumental figure. They are always 
imagined as exceptional characters, living out of the categorical frames of the tidy and 
regular world, bearers of extraordinary attributes and powers. 
At the same time, crises have shown that in post-traditional societies the emotional 
concentrations that concur to produce a great individual have to take place in a more or less 
capricious, and yet democratic, way. Chance and merit must play a major role in the rise of 
the popular leader, illustrious criminal, or mass media idol. Aga Khan, Charles Manson, 
Marilyn Monroe: they came out of ‘nothing’, and their negative or positive reputation 
belongs only to them. What is at stake here is not a prestige derived from established 
statutes (hereditary king or untouchable Hindu), but a prestige of person. Great individuals 
appear as indeterminate existences, freed from societal bonds by a ‘gift’ that they possess. 
Nevertheless, if the ‘substance’ of their monumental individuation is a collective one, this 
prestige does not depend – or does not depend only – on their particular characteristics or 
skills. Those great men or women are, maybe more than anyone else, actors. And this is so
even as their role depends neither on their will nor on an established institutional complex. 
Their prestigious script is fundamentally derived from the dynamics and the contents of the 
multitudinous affective imagination that designates and supports them. That is why they are 
sacred characters, the ‘chosen ones’.
Crime is a major pathway to this type of individuation: that of the excessive and 
dazzling being. Such individuation, in this case, is certainly not correlative to the social 
ensemble of roles and fixed hierarchies but to the states of multitude that crime itself 
provokes. Since crime breaks the juridical rule in its capacity to establish regularity and to 
produce order, criminals will be seen, in varying degrees, as irregular and unconditioned. 
The growth and the opacity of their public figures will be in proportion to the importance of 
the prohibitions that they transgress and the way they do so. But, again, their success as 
great individuals depends more on ‘fortune’ – the randomness of collective affectivity –
than on their personal ‘merits’. Once a prohibited act is committed it is expected that, under 
certain conditions of visibility and communication, collective imagination does the rest.
10
Finally, the analyses of periods of profound social commotion allow us to state that 
the conditions for the emergence of a great criminal are analogous to those which make 
possible the charismatic leader. Notable consequences stem from this point. Let us mention 
one of them: the collective reaction to crime, heterogeneous towards positive law and its 
administration, is, conversely, isomorphic towards the processes of power formation. And 
once again critical periods, junctures in which those processes become ‘personified’, permit 
one to observe such relations (or, in any case, to formulate such hypotheses). They also 
allow us to postulate certain structural analogies between charismatic leaders and great 
criminals. Both rise from the nadir of the faceless multitude and, in a certain sense, 
incarnate it. Both are individuals of exception that concentrate and catalyze collective 
emotions to become exuberant figures, appearing to resist totally the order of rational 
arguments, the interchangeability of roles and the social contract. Yet, it is true; there are 
essential differences between them. The criminal’s force is one that dissolves, whereas the 
leader’s force is one that institutes. Leaders appear with a ‘mission’ of regenerating the 
social body from which they arise, and in which they intervene by fixing and transforming 
the collective energy, by producing the passage from repulsion to attraction, by operating 
the canalization of the states of multitude for the benefit of an actual or future order. In the
multitudinous imagination the leader is a cure, while criminal is a poison. However, that 
does not prevent them from sharing genetic, formal and – as we will see – even substantive 
analogies. Both of them fall out of the established frames of the social group and are not 
inhibited by the law in force. They do not take part in the time of law, but in the time before 
the law was written. Both belong to the ‘sacred hour’ in which power is formed, a time that
cancels or renews the very grounds of the societal order. Anything can be expected from
them, and, willingly or not, everything is granted to them. A superhuman strength, will, 
intelligence and passion are – separately or in conjunction – attributed to them. They 
inhabit the space of the gods and the wild animals– that is, the space of sovereignty.6
The Criminal as Sovereign Individual (The Royal Function)
As mythical type, the sovereign individual possesses all the prerogatives of a subject that is 
never in the position of object, who is never an instrument or means. Those who are 
sovereigns act; they deny the given; they are always a cause, never an effect. They do not 
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accept any value different from their own hic-et-nunc will, and therefore they are not 
interchangeable with anything or anybody. At the limit, they do not accept any condition: 
they are unconditioned conditions. They play but they are not played. And, fundamentally,
sovereign individuals do not work, they consume. They are, in short, imaginary doubles of 
the average individual: the individual who must obey others’ rules, who is in the habit of 
avoiding violent pleasures, who spends moderately, who must return to work every day. 
That is why the position of the historical – or better, mytho-historical – sovereign
individual is peculiar. Their consumption of wealth or life (their own or someone else’s) 
becomes a consumption for others, one that must be conspicuous since what is at stake here 
is a social duty: the accomplishment of a mythological function that Bataille (1993, p. 248)
calls the ‘royal function’.
According to Bataille, the royal function of great individuals is related to the
existing tension between a restricted and a general economy of the collective affectivity.
The former refers to the affectivity involved in the functioning of the dominant socio-
symbolic structure, the latter to the heterogeneous states active in individuals and groups. 
The first one connects the concepts of individual, reproduction and general equivalence – as 
well as those of knowledge, positive law and technique; the second articulates the notions 
of multitude, unproductive expenditure, the gift and the sacred – as well as myth, taboo and 
power. Intense affectivity is always excessive and potentially destructive from the point of
view of the restricted economy and is, therefore, excluded from the world of labour and
common sense. Nevertheless, there are paradoxical symbolic devices destined to deal with 
this excessive affectivity. These devices can be spatial, temporal, physical or human, but all 
of them have the specific function of producing certain types of communication between
both economies. The model here is the feast, as Roger Caillois (1950) understands it: a time 
of expenditure and license opposed to the habitual time of appropriation and constrictions, 
but whose limitation and ritualization grant a purgative value favourable to the reproduction 
of social structure. 
Sovereign individuals are a particular type of such symbolic devices. That is why 
Bataille (1993,p. 249) could write that the sovereign individual is to space what the feast is 
to time. It is a function of sovereign individuals to liberate the affective fluxes of the
multitude and to reflect, in a cathartic and spectacular operation, the violence of feelings 
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and beliefs that remain diffuse, and even refused, in every ‘small’ individual. In acting and 
reacting at the edge of collective affectivity, the sovereign individual produces a contagious 
communication between these spectators: a crowd-like contagion that is deeper the more 
irrational it is. These spectators, in contemplating the exhibition of luxury, sexual disorder
and/or the power of death, vicariously experience a detachment from the constrictive 
boredom of everyday life. 
Bataille (1993, p.233) stated that sovereign individuals used to be fundamental 
devices in the socio-symbolical space of sacrificial and monarchic societies. But when the 
authority of the sacred or divine kings was eliminated and the religious feast became
inoffensive, it might be said – by extending Bataille’s thesis – that nowadays royal 
functions are fulfilled by some eminent members of the elites of wealth and power, together 
with the most popular celebrities of the society of the spectacle and the current ‘decorative’
monarchies. We should also add that if, in the multitudinous imagination, the sovereign is 
the one who lives beyond labour and juridical constrictions and is afraid of neither 
receiving nor conferring death, then the criminal seems to be particularly suitable to 
personify this mythical type in our societies. This is especially true of the criminal that has 
been recognized as such by the multitude. A characteristic bond with excessive waste, 
sexuality and violence is attributed to him (or to her). The accursed share of the subjects
belongs to these transgressors: that is to say, all these feelings, images, thinking and acts 
have been produced as residue and monstrosity by the ensemble of science, work, morality
and law. 
If criminals shine and darkly seduce, it is because they personify the myth of an 
insubordinate existence; they offer the vision of a singular life, out of the functional 
alveolus and constrictive rules of the societal machine. Their glory is dire but it does not 
prevent it from being glory. They usually become negative celebrities, sharing the stage of 
notoriety with others inhabitants of the symbolic space of our societies. They are the 
savage, the sick and/or evil ones; the incarnation of formless nature; the leper or the pest;
the dissolvent immorality. But at the same time, their acts and, in some cases, their ways of 
life seem to engender admiration and envy. They are the points of imputation of the non-
recognized emotions and meanings that are alive, in some spectral way, in everybody else: 
foul love, unlimited egoism, bloody rebelliousness, enjoyed cruelty, and so on.
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These criminals are inevitably imagined as chaotic, excessive and violent.
Nevertheless, many of them are not strictly adapted to this mandate (or at least not totally,
and not all the time). Apparently Al Capone was comparable, for his capacity for
organization and his pace of work, to any mega-company manager (on the contrary, no
company manager could equalize his capacity for violence and, as a result, his profile of
archetypal gangster). Something similar seems to happen concerning the pleasure attributed 
to some ‘dissipated’ sexual experiences: when sexual transgression becomes routine, they
tend to lose, for the one who enacts it, the characteristic dizziness of exception. However, it 
is clear that this is not the point here, since the transgression evoked in the violence of death 
or in the disorder of sex interests us because of its social function, for what it is capable of 
providing to the multitude of spectators that observe it, fascinated and repelled by its mise
en scène.
Landru´s Case: The Blue Beard from Gambais
During the first decades of the 20th century, many Frenchmen might have had a similar 
appearance to Henri Désiré Landru during his public trial in Versailles’s Criminal 
Chamber: a dark suit and tie, not very tall, bald head, thick beard. Only when he spoke did 
he become interesting. His baritone voice, his remarkable discursive eloquence, his slight 
sense of humor, his calm and disturbing responses, might have indicated that he was not
like everybody else. Nevertheless, there were no physical features that suggested his 
violence, except perhaps for his very black eyes. Or was this excess of darkness a reflex of 
the thousands of gazes that found their own void in Landru´s image? It seems that Landru, 
with this appearance and these eyes, had murdered ten women in the space of five years. 
This triple play of contrasts – insipid appearance, magic voice, killer actions – helped to 
produce his disquieting prolife: that of a polite citizen, a tidy and scrupulous tradesman
who hypnotized his victims (with his look, with his words) to satisfy his very low instincts 
and to take away their lives. Triviality, seduction and mortal violence were concentrated in 
his figure. However, all of this would have never been visible without a stage: his 
photographs and portraits accompanied by chronicles (fictions) of his life and crimes, 
reproduced in the thousands by the press.
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Since its first apparition in a small sensationalist newspaper, his name knew only 
hyperbole. Almost immediately the headlines of Le Figaro claimed: ‘Landru, dit Barbe-
Bleue’, subsequently echoed by the New York Times: ‘French Bluebeard’ (see Walz, 2000).
Landru was a major mass-media subject, and from the popular cafés to the exclusive 
salons, a continuous rumour reconstructed and enlarged his silhouette. Ultimately, the day 
his trial began, he was the king of French imagination. Nobles, diplomats, wealthy persons
and other stable functionaries of the vicarious consumption of the multitude, formed long
rows in the courthouse, exhibiting – as they had to – their jewels, overcoats and walking 
sticks. They were the select public who were present for the penal drama that Landru had
wonderfully put in motion. They were waiting to see and listen to this new-comer to fame 
and luxury – an undoubtedly dark luxury: the one that wastes lives. Facing the Parisian elite 
that enjoyed a statutory prestige, he who had been a mediocre merchant now possessed a
prestige of person. He had reached this summit by his own means. He deserved respect, and 
he obtained it: this cluster of notables would accompany him the whole trial. Each of the 
twenty-one days that the public process lasted they would be there, almost two thousand 
persons in a room prepared for three hundred. Landru, for his part, would not disappoint
them; neither them – his socially acceptable counterparts– nor the common people who
turned into a diffuse crowd temporarily constituted by his performance. Landru was a 
notable actor. He showed great concentration, self-control and eloquence in playing his 
role. But what was this role that he was being asked to play? Perhaps he was asked to
support the ambiguity produced by the vision of a common man juxtaposed to the 
phantoms of rape and murder. Possibly he was also asked to incarnate the portrait of what 
an average Frenchman was and what he obscurely could be. In any case, he was being 
requested to collaborate in his coronation as one of the major criminals of the century.
Before the prosecutor, invoking God’s name, asked for his head, science occupied 
its official place. First, three psychiatrists affirmed that the accused was perfectly normal, 
his intelligence developed, his memory and oratorical capacity impressive. They affirmed 
that Landru was not suffering any mental disorder: neither psychosis, nor pathological 
obsessions, nor a state of confusion. He was not registering perversions, he did not drink or 
smoke, and his sexual appetites were most ordinary.
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Later, another expert, a famous forensic doctor, presented a report in relation to his
experiments with Landru’s stove: ‘It burns very well, especially the fats. It takes thirty-
eight minutes to consume an empty head; a hundred minutes for a complete head with 
brain, eyes, hairs and tongue. To burn a foot requires forty-five minutes. The most difficult 
thing, gentlemen, are the intestines’(Pottecher 1981, p. 148).Towards the end, the doctor 
presented hundred and ninety-six grammes of human bones extracted from a hundred kilos 
of ash found near Landru´s house in Gambais.
Landru, for his part, gave the explanations that he could or that he wanted to, and he
never recognized the crimes imputed to him. On 30 November 1921 his death sentence was 
pronounced to a full room.
One year after his execution, objects that had been used as evidence during the 
penal process were offered for auction. The public come out in multitudes again. The most 
valued piece, the most highly priced, was the small rusty stove.
The mythological heritage of the present
Whoever breaks a sacred rule becomes impure: religious thinking establishes this law. But
even as subjects of secularization, we often believe it as well. And it is possible that 
criminals think in that way too. Because they are finally human, they cannot escape from
being granted their social and personal identity at the hands of others. That is why they
anoint themselves with the power that is attributed to them, and feel themselves stronger 
and less human than average. And they are, in a sense. They harden themselves if they 
believe, as others do, that their blemish is inexpiable. When this happens, all protagonists 
of the drama are communicated in a manner that might well be called mytho-historical.
It is true that for our juridical regulations there exists nothing but citizens 
(responsible subjects of rights).The one who violates a norm which preceded his/her action
and defines it as prohibited is bureaucratically treated with penal measures previously 
established. So presented, the transgressor appears merely as an offender. His/her only real 
identity is juridical, and his/her only differential attribute is having committed an act 
forbidden by a rule in force. Yet, in certain conditions of visibility and communicability, an 
unlit collective dynamic becomes mobilized. On those occasions transgressors are anything 
but insipid offenders. If they used to belong to society, their forbidden act turns them into a 
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new type of being. Now they are criminals, and the figures of the wild, the mad or the evil,
come to cover them and to expel them from their anodyne condition of citizen. It is as 
though their anti-juridical action had revealed a truth: if they are criminals, they are not like 
everyone else. And being seen as the Other of law, they also appear as the Other of society. 
That exteriority makes them opaque and powerful. Now they are radically strangers within 
the social body: repulsive and fascinating objects, capable of generating extreme feelings in 
average individuals.
The transgression of limits with foundational value for the societal order produces a 
cognitive and affective shock in its subjects. Subsequently, the source of their response 
goes from identitarian thinking and instrumental (re)action, distinctive of societal 
intersubjective relations, to another level: the one determined by the prevalence of intense 
affectivity and mythological syntaxes. Especially when it is related to sexuality and death, 
criminal events mobilize this heterogeneous economy, putting individuals out of 
themselves – or in processes, as Kristeva (1998) would say.
Criminal events produce, then, a mode of communication that does not correspond 
to socially structured roles and functions but rather to states of multitude. In these states 
(characteristic of crowds, but also of publics), desires, beliefs and narratives, usually hidden 
in the margins of societal spaces and the individual`s understanding, arise and are 
disseminated. Crime as pollution, social sickness, or declaration of war; criminals as 
powerful enemies, as the state of nature’s savages, as evil incarnated or natural-born 
delinquents: wherever those figures and the syntaxes that sustain them can be found, it will 
be possible to postulate that a multitudinous mode of sociability is at work. 
When real or supposed criminals turn into points of imputation of these states, they 
become attractive and repulsive at once. They function as attractors capable of catalyzing
affective imagination up to the summit where the experience of contiguity (and even
continuity) of habitually antithetical psychological and moral values can be verified. 
Touched by those multitudinary flows, transgressors acquire a monumental stature. When
supported by collective forces they become ambiguous celebrities, sharing major positions
with other inhabitants of the symbolic space of our societies. Then, as separate and even 
transcendent objects involved in a mysterious halo, these criminals are sociologically great 
individuals and mythologically sovereigns. If they enjoy this disquieting reputation it is 
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because they accomplish the odd social function of being the monstrous double of the 
individual subject to law. 
No doubt it would be possible to elaborate a typology of great criminals on the basis
of the collective beliefs and emotions that they personify and enact. And no doubt this 
typology would say much about the societies where these criminals arise and which they 
only partially contradict.
                                                
1 Heterogeneity is a notion that tries to give a name to the experiences of radical alterities from everyday life, 
experiences that cannot be named in terms of the habitual language that provides the categorical framework 
within which the event that will be perceived as heterogeneous occurs. According to Georges Bataille (1970), 
the experience of violence can be called heterogeneous – in opposition to the ‘homogeneous’ social world 
composed by technique, science, bureaucracy and the individual. He coined both notions (homogeneity and 
heterogeneity) in 1930s by critically making use of the concepts elaborated by Durkheim and L’Année 
Sociologique group to study archaic religions. To Bataille, the shocking experience of heterogeneity is 
analogous in secular societies to the experience of the sacred in traditional ones. For him and his colleagues at
the Collége de Sociologie the fact that the sacred lacks its traditional historical expressions (religion and 
monarchy) does not mean that its syntax and its affective economy have disappeared. Rather, it means that it 
has freed itself from its old references and that it is available to acquire new forms, especially when a 
commotion in the profane day-to-day generates a shock intense enough to rouse its experience again. In their 
analysis of interwar European societies, Bataille, Caillois, Leiris and Monnerot showed that the feeling of the 
sacred and the symbolic thinking that corresponds to it reach vertiginous heights among generally 
disenchanted individuals. They showed that heterogeneity corresponds to the sacred, if not in the 
consciousness of those individuals, at least in their experiences and practices. That is why, in my opinion, 
Bataille’s theoretical developments may be useful to investigate the current socio-psychological dynamic of 
collective beliefs and affectivity, and to affirm that important dimensions of the ‘secular’ criminal question 
can be explained in these terms. For the relationship between the Collège and the legacy of L’Année 
Sociologique, see Caillois (1949), as well as Richman (2002). For the major texts of the Collège, see Hollier
(1988). For an elaboration of possible conceptual bonds between Durkheimian sociology and Bataille’s 
critique of culture, see Alexander (2001).
2In fact, crime is a limit-notion of any socio-symbolic order, and the criminal is a mytho-historical figure tout 
court and not only in conditions of massive fear. By following the Collège’s theoretical framework, it is 
possible to state that crime and criminals can only be thought of mythically, whether in times of upheaval or 
regularity. In Bataille’s terms, criminal violence does not belong to the societal space of economical, juridical 
and political positions, and it can only be grasped by a way of thinking that is also opposed to this space: ‘the 
symbolic or mythical thinking, which Levy-Bruhl mistakenly called primitive’ (Bataille1986,p. 46). 
Postulating a fundamental heterogeneity between violence and the world of labour and reason, only in 
mythical discourse does Bataille find the chance (including the sense of randomness this word evokes) to talk 
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about violence without covering it with radical ignorance, without making it reasonable. For him, the means 
of access to the ‘truth’ of criminal violence is not scientific discourse but the mythical (or better, poetical) 
word.
3
To begin to understand collective reaction to crime, as well as the myth of the criminal and its functions in 
contemporary societies, the original articulation between Durkheimiam and Maussian sociology and 
psychoanalysis produced by Bataille seems to be a solid and stimulating point of departure. But to give a total 
account on this matter, this point of departure needs to be articulated with other references. To make
Bataille’s sociological approach fully contemporary it is necessary to complete it with a theory of the mass-
media production and mediation of collective emotions, beliefs and representations. In this regard, among 
others references, Tarde’s (1901) sociology of crowds and publics (available to the members of the Collège, 
but apparently neglected by them) could be useful, as well as some works of Baudrillard (1983; 2002)– in 
many ways dependent on Bataille’s conceptions. This important subject was not developed in the present 
article. I limited myself to localizing the conceptual place of mass media in a very general manner by relating 
it to the notions of visibility and staging. Nevertheless, as I intended to show, central aspects of the
contemporary criminal question, linked to general psychosocial dynamics in societies of spectacle, can be 
productively analyzed with the Collège’s conceptual tools. 
4 See Foucault (1999); Agamben (1998); Derrida (2009). 
5 René Girard (1985) wonderfully illustrates the inverse mutation of collective affectivity (from attraction to 
repulsion) by analyzing how Job, the biblical character, was the ‘victim of his people’. 
6 See Bataille (1989). Georgio Agamben (1998) has developed this notion of sovereignty as mythological 
space, foundational of the social order, in the vein of Bataille’s researches about the links between religion, 
political power and the myth of animality. 
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